Macrofoundations for A (Near) 2% Inflation Target by Faugere, Christophe
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Macrofoundations for A (Near) 2%
Inflation Target
Christophe Faugere
University at Albany Finance Department
June 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23491/
MPRA Paper No. 23491, posted 25. June 2010 06:31 UTC
 
 
 
MACROFOUNDATIONS FOR A (NEAR) 2% INFLATION TARGET♠ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christophe Faugère∗ 
 
 
 
June 2010 
 
 
                                                 
♠I thank Richard Anderson and Peter Ireland for their valuable comments, Don Dutkowsky for graciously 
answering my inquiries regarding his (and his co-authors’) database, and finally the participants at the fall 
2009 UAlbany Economics seminar for their suggestions. Any remaining errors are of course mine. 
∗Department of Finance and Center for Institutional Investment Management, University at Albany, 
Albany, NY 12222. E-mail: cfaugere@uamail.albany.edu. 
 
 
 
MACROFOUNDATIONS FOR A (NEAR) 2% INFLATION TARGET 
 
 
 
Abstract. Economists have argued that a long-term inflation target near 2% is 
optimal (Summers, 1991; Fischer, 1996; Goodfriend, 2002; Coenen et al., 2003; 
Bernanke, 2003). However, these arguments are really about why a low positive 
inflation rate is ideal to avoid a deflationary trap, not explaining why the specific 
value of 2% (or a value near it) happens to be the optimal long-run inflation rate. In 
line with the transaction motive literature (Baumol, 1952 and Tobin, 1956), I 
postulate that financial innovations generate transactional cost savings by 
comparison to barter. The overall trend in productivity growth affecting financial 
transactions and the advent of credit cards in the world economy are crucial factors. I 
derive the optimal velocity of money, which depends on real GDP/capita and the net 
return on depository institutions’ assets. As long as progress is on average biased 
towards new forms of money, the velocity of money will grow at a pace slower than 
long-term real GDP/capita growth; i.e. less than 2%. Along with a parameter 
representing the type of bias in the technical progress affecting transactions, the 
depository institutions’ overall mean leverage ratio also appears as a key parameter 
in the long-run equilibrium equation describing the behavior of the velocity of 
narrow money (M1, M1RS and M1S). I use Johansen’s (1988, 1991 and 1995) 
VECM approach for the U.S. from 1959-2007 and find good support for the model. I 
show that a ‘naïve’ Friedman k-percent monetary rule that aims at growing the 
money supply at the same rate as real GDP naturally leads to a rate of inflation equal 
to the rate of velocity growth. Hence, setting an inflation target near but below 2% 
makes economic sense. In spite of previously held beliefs, a money growth objective 
is compatible with an interest-targeting objective; i.e. a derived Taylor (1993) type 
rule. A Taylor rule that embeds the optimal inflation target defined here is more 
flexible to account for possible changes in velocity vs. a pure money growth rule. 
 
Keywords: Inflation target, velocity of narrow money, M1, M1RS, M1S, real GDP per capita growth, 
barter, financial leverage. 
 
JEL: E40 
 
1. Introduction 
Although current Fed chairman Bernanke has long been a fervent advocate of inflation 
targeting (Bernanke et al., 1999), and although, the U.S. Federal Reserve has been setting 
implicit inflation targets off and on over the past two decades, interest rate targeting has 
been and still is the primary tool of U.S. monetary policy.1 Economists are well aware of 
the limitations associated with both inflation and interest rate targeting (Kozicki, 1999; 
Benhabib et al., 2001; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2003; Sims, 2004; McCallum, 2006). Yet, 
there is clearly a scope for both methods to serve as complementary monetary policy 
tools. An instance of this conjunction is the U.S. monetary policy of the late 1980s, which 
is well characterized by John Taylor’s interest rate rule (1993).2  As is sometimes 
overlooked, Taylor’s (1993) rule contains both a 2% interest rate target and a 2% 
inflation target in its formulation. 
Inflation targeting was first adopted as a primary policy instrument by the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand in 1988. Other G-7 central banks followed suite in the early 1990s. 
Since then a consensus has emerged among central bankers and economists that a narrow 
inflation range around 2% is optimal (see Table 1). The extant literature essentially 
demonstrates that a low positive inflation rate is ideal to avoid a deflationary trap. It stops 
short of providing any micro- or macro- foundation for why 2% happens to be the 
“magic” number.3 For example, in a speech at the St. Louis Fed 28th Annual Policy 
                                                 
1The U.S. Fed has targeted short-term interest rates intermittently since the 1920s under the Riefler-Burgess 
doctrine. Prolonged periods of fed fund targeting occurred in the 1950s and 1960s (Meltzer, 2003 and 
2009).  The 1980’s is often designated as the beginning of a more systematic interest rate targeting policy 
in the U.S. (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1992; Thornton, 2005). 
2 In a classic article, Taylor (1993) shows that the behavior of short-term interest rates from 1987 to 1992 
follows a simple feedback rule based on achieving a 2% real interest rate target, correcting for deviations of 
inflation from a 2% target, as well as percentage deviations of real GDP from trend. Goodfriend (2005) 
argues that the Fed effectively practiced inflation targeting during the Greenspan years, but that 
interpretation has not been endorsed by Fed officials (Kohn, 2005). The presence of a 2% inflation target in 
Taylor’s (1993) rule is indicative that Goodfriend’s view may have some validity. 
3 It is important to point out that 2% is a focal point in the literature. Many articles either cite 2% explicitly 
or give a desired narrow range around 2%. Summers (1991) asserts that the optimal long-run inflation rate 
is between 2 and 3%. However, his argument is brief and sketchy and does not justify why this specific 
range is best. Fischer (1996) lists a series of informal arguments centered on the Phillips curve and the 
difficulties of dealing with a zero inflation rate for stimulating the economy during slowdown periods. He 
states that “These arguments point to a target inflation rate in the 1 to 3 percent range; more specifically, 
they suggest that inflation should be targeted at about 2 percent, to stay within a range of 1 to 3 percent 
per year. This is in practice what most central banks mean by price stability; it is also a target that most G-
7 central banks have already attained.” Goodfriend (2002) states that “Strictly targeting inflation between 
1 and 2 percent could firmly anchor expected inflation and still give a central bank leeway to push the real 
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Conference, Bernanke (2003) introduces the concept of optimal long-run inflation rate. 
The speech’s main reference is an article by Coenen et al. (2003) who support a 2% 
target in order to keep deflation at bay. Coenen et al. simulate the impact of various 
inflation targets on the means and variances of inflation and output. They find that 
lowering the target inflation rate down to 2% has little effect on the variability and level 
of output when imposing a zero bound on the short-term interest rate. But output suffers 
when inflation targets range between 0 and 1%. Clearly the 2% value has great 
significance as a threshold point in their model. Nevertheless, the authors do not attempt 
to formally relate the 2% threshold to any underlying macro or microeconomic factor(s). 
In this paper, I show that an inflation rate near 2% naturally arises as the product of 
financial innovations and the pursuit of price stability. In line with the transaction motive 
literature (Baumol, 1952; Tobin, 1956), I argue that money reduces transaction costs as 
compared to barter. The novelty is that the transaction cost savings can be directly 
inputted in terms of the loss of real GDP/capita that would occur if the economy reverted 
to barter. The fraction of real output saved is assumed to be a function of technical 
progress and of the cost of substitutes of money, in particular credits cards. 
The introduction and expansion of credit cards in the world economy has been a 
major factor for speeding-up the velocity of money (Geanakoplos and Dubey, 2009). I 
demonstrate that transaction cost savings vary positively with the net return on assets for 
depository institutions.4 This is not trivial and the argument requires a separate and 
extensive analysis of the interaction between the markets for credit card loans and general 
“bank” loans. Putting these elements together, and given that the transactional cost 
savings of money are reduced when more money-like substitutes (credit cards) are used, I 
find that there must be a positive relation between transactional cost savings and the 
financial sector’s net asset returns. 
                                                                                                                                                 
short term rate 1 to 2 percentage points below zero. Evidence from U.S. monetary history suggests that 
such leeway would be enough to enable a central bank to preempt deflation and stabilize the economy 
against most adverse shocks.” More recently, Blanchard et al. (2010) argue for an inflation target around 
4%, mostly in response to the 2007 financial crisis and the return of liquidity traps. 
4 This is related to the concept of net interest margin. The difference is that the return on net assets uses 
equity as the base, whereas the net interest margin uses total assets. 
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On the other hand, technical progress has also helped reduce the transaction costs 
associated with barter, “primitive” forms of money5 and fiat money as well. For example, 
the creation of a fully electronic banking clearinghouse system such as ACH (1994) has 
speeded-up interbank settlements, and the use of electronic money has boomed with 
online shopping and banking, due to the development of web browsers (1994). 
I use real GDP per-capita (labor productivity) as the variable representing technical 
progress. I distinguish between two main categories of progress: regime-biased and 
regime-neutral progress. Regime-biased technological progress enhances the relative 
efficiency of a given form of money by comparison to barter, which leads to ever greater 
savings from using that form of money. A regime-neutral technological innovation 
renders all forms of money and barter more efficient, and therefore the relative savings 
do not change. 
I derive the optimal aggregate quantity of money per-capita (and velocity of money) 
by equating the marginal value of cost savings to the opportunity cost of holding money 
relative to barter. I find that the optimal velocity of money is declining with the net return 
on assets for depository institutions and thus is also a declining function of a parameter 
representing the long-term leverage of these institutions. Furthermore, the log of the 
velocity of money is a linear function of the log of real GDP/capita. If technical progress 
in the transaction technology is slightly regime-biased towards the current form of 
money, the model implies that the velocity of money rises at a rate close but less than 
long-run real GDP/capita growth (2.19% over the period 1959-2007). 
I conduct empirical tests of these relations using Johansen’s (1988, 1991 and 1995) 
VECM to estimate the long-run equilibrium for the U.S. velocity of narrow money over 
the period 1959-2007. Since the mid-1980s, and due to changes in the behavior and 
components of this aggregate, M1 is no longer considered the appropriate measure of 
narrow money. I test the model using alternate narrow money measures (M1RS and 
M1S) developed by Dutkowsky, Cynamon and Jones (2006). Overall, the results lend 
strong support to the model. In all cases, I find that progress indeed has been new regime 
biased, and that the growth rate of velocity is estimated at 1.91%. 
                                                 
5 The idea has a well established tradition. Richard Cantillon, John Locke, Knut Wicksell, Irving Fisher, 
and Milton Friedman all pointed to innovations as a factor speeding-up the velocity of money (Humphrey, 
1993). 
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Notwithstanding, as M1 does not escape reserve requirements, the connection 
between M1 velocity and depository institutions’ actual leverage appears clearer and 
more stable than when M1RS and M1S are used. This is because, in the aggregate, (credit 
card) loans must be a multiple of demand deposits, where the multiple is closely related 
to the actual (maximized) leverage used by depository institutions. On the other hand, 
when taking into account the deposits that escape reserve requirements for example due 
to sweep programs, I recover a value for the estimated leverage parameter that is close to 
imposed limits historically set by the Fed, the FDIC and international agreements on 
capital adequacy ratios (Basel I and II), when using the new aggregates M1RS and M1S. 
I then show that if the money supply follows a “naïve” Friedman (1960) k-percent 
rule that aims at achieving price stability, the long-run rate inflation is also a simple linear 
function of the long-run real GDP/capita growth.6 In other words, given that the velocity 
of money expands due to innovations, when monetary authorities pursue a M1 growth 
target that matches the growth in real GDP, then a long-term inflation near 2% is implied. 
Based on the velocity cointegrating equations, my point estimate for the long-run 
inflation rate equals the growth rate of velocity; again 1.91%. Contrary to the widespread 
belief that money growth rules are incompatible with interest rate targeting rules, this 
particular k-percent rule is fully consistent with a derived Taylor (1993) type rule. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I develop the transaction cost 
savings function and justify its form in the context of the historical evolution of money. 
In section 3, I develop the optimality condition leading to the determination of the 
optimal velocity as well as the optimal quantity of narrow money. I introduce the VECM 
framework for the empirical tests in section 4. Section 5 features the tests for various 
measures of narrow money (M1 and adjusted measures of M1). Section 6 demonstrates 
how the optimal long-run inflation rate is tied to real GDP/capita growth. Section 7 
shows the compatibility of a version of Friedman’s (1960) k-percent rule with a new 
Taylor-type rule. Section 8 discusses Friedman’s (1969) deflationary monetary policy 
proposal in the context of the new interest targeting rule derived in section 7. Possible 
extensions are discussed in the concluding section. 
                                                 
6 I term this a ‘naïve’ k-percent rule because monetary authorities have historically treated the velocity of 
money as a random walk with zero drift (Bordo and Jonung, 1987). 
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 2. The Evolution of Money and Transaction Cost Savings 
Without a standard of exchange, transaction costs would rise steeply in the economy. A 
pure barter economy constrains trade and production. James Tobin (1992, p. 18) writes 
“Does an economy arrive at the same real outcomes… as it would with the institution of 
money? Clearly not. Without money, confined to barter, the economy would produce a 
different menu of products, less of most things. People would spend more time searching 
for trades and less in actual production, consumption and leisure.”7 In The Age of 
Turbulence, Alan Greenspan (2007, p. 2) reflects that: “We’d always thought that if you 
wanted to cripple the U.S. economy, you’d take out the payment system… Businesses 
would resort to barter and IOUs; the level of economic activity across the country could 
drop like a rock.” 
In general, transactions costs associated with barter originate from 1) bookkeeping 
and coordination costs due to tracking relative prices for great variety of goods and 
services (menu costs); 2) the cost of storing perishable goods for the sole purpose of 
trading, which leads to waste, and 3) the search cost associated with finding bilateral 
trades or achieving double-coincidence of wants. The thesis of this paper is that each one 
of these costs manifests as a reduction of real GDP/capita from its otherwise ‘potential’ 
level achievable with the institution of money. 
In a commodity-money (CM) economy, money is a physical good produced in 
limited supply or supplied at a slow rate because of high marginal costs of prospection 
and extraction. While technical progress can push down per-unit costs, it is clear that 
society must divert resources away from consumption and investment goods in order to 
produce the commodity money solely for transaction purposes (Friedman, 1951). Of 
course, this cost must be smaller than the cost associated with a barter economy, 
otherwise society would not adopt CM. Friedman estimates the cost of production of 
commodity money at about 1.5% of GDP. In what is possibly the clearest thinking on the 
topic of commodity-money standards, Friedman (1951, p. 210) writes: “… in a world in 
which total output is growing in response to technological and other changes and in 
                                                 
7 Tobin (1992) is careful to distinguish between the real effects due to the absence of a standard medium of 
exchange vs. the use of a numeraire. Of course, changing the units of account (new numeraire) has no real 
effect. This is the classical neutrality of money proposition. 
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which the velocity of circulation is fairly constant, a strict commodity standard requires 
the regular use of a considerable volume of resources for additions to the monetary stock 
in order to keep prices stable.” And in the adjacent footnote he adds “…The naïve notion 
that there is an immediate and direct “economy” in the use of gold achieved by making 
gold a fraction of the total circulating medium is obviously wrong.” 
Historically, barter and CM economies have experienced flat or even negative real 
per-capita economic growth. Based on GDP and population data compiled by Maddison 
(World Tables, 2001) the average nominal GDP/capita growth was a miserly 0.02% per 
year over the period 1 AD to 1700, about 50 years prior to the first industrial revolution. 
During that span of time, inflationary periods alternated with deflationary periods. 
Historians have documented that Western Europe experienced a deep deflation in the 
second quarter of the 14th Century, then a drastic inflation in the three decades that 
followed (Munro, 1984). In England, the price surge was further fueled by a series of 
coinage debasements. No other severe deflation occurred, at least in England, over the 
period covering the 1400s until the 1870s. 
When real GDP/capita growth is flat or even negative, transactions are not increasing 
in volume so rapidly as to outstrip the supply of commodity monies, which leads to stable 
prices. Thus, CM continues being used as long as the marginal intrinsic value of one unit 
of CM is greater than its marginal cost of production. With the industrial revolution and 
the corresponding boost to productivity growth, governments found it more difficult to 
maintain ease of trade with metal monies. This is because the production of the 
commodity money was not keeping pace with economic growth. They faced the prospect 
of secular deflation and the ensuing risk of economic contractions, as long as money was 
either an actual commodity or was backed by one (Friedman, 1951; Bordo and Filardo, 
2005).8 
                                                 
8 Economists have recently revisited the conventional wisdom regarding the economic impact of deflations. 
Bordo and Filardo (2005) distinguish between what they term good, bad and ugly deflations. They classify 
the period from 1921-1929 as a good deflation with a mild price decline of 1-2% per year. Good deflations 
are initiated by boosts in productivity growth. However, it is not clear whether even good deflations may 
start that way and end-up being bad deflations because of a reduction in aggregate demand due to hoarding 
money and nominal cuts in wages leading to prices spiraling down and economic slowdown. The policy 
reaction of monetary authorities obviously matter a lot. The 1928 Fed policy tightening is viewed as 
responsible for turning the good deflation into the economic contraction of 1929-1933. 
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Of course, an increase in the velocity of money could have taken care of this problem. 
But there are technological constraints to increasing the velocity in a pure CM economy. 
The banking clearinghouse system experiences bottlenecks when the volume of 
transactions multiplies rapidly due to the resource cost of CM production, the cost of 
transporting physical money and the limited capacity of commercial banks to use the 
money multiplier (Norman, Shaw and Speight, 2006).9 Technical progress did not 
provide much relief to reduce these costs either. 
The logical solution was to introduce fiat money (FM). A transition phase in which 
paper money was backed by precious metal reserves was the natural course taken by 
many economies. This stage was a natural extension of banking via the issuance of 
goldsmiths’ certificates. It was also important for economic agents to gain trust and 
acceptance for this new form of money. However, that stage could have been bypassed 
because it eventually leads to the same problem as a strict commodity standard. 
For example, during the Gold standard era with backed paper money, the deflationary 
period of 1873-1896 appears to have been caused by a drop in the growth of gold 
production while the production of other goods accelerated. The great gold rush in U.S. 
and Australia of the 1850s had run its course by the 1860s. From 1870 to 1896, the 
general level of prices declined at an average rate of 1.1% per year. Deflation arose as a 
consequence of too few money chasing too many goods, because the stock of paper 
money was in fixed proportion to gold (and silver) reserves.10 
From its creation in 1913, the Federal Reserve System has served as an increasingly 
efficient clearinghouse for the banking sector and has taken the role of supplier of 
liquidity of last resort. This has insured that interbank settlements are no longer the major 
                                                 
9 Even though they were able to create inside money, in the form of IOUs to partially circumvent that 
problem. 
10 Short-term deflationary episodes could also happen as result of speculation or arbitrage. For example, the 
passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 effectively put the United States on a bimetallic currency standard. 
When the value of silver started dropping relative to gold, economic agents exchanged their silver for 
dollars (at a legal fixed rate) and in turn demanded gold for their dollars. This riskless arbitrage continued 
to drain gold from the U.S. monetary system and provoked a financial panic in 1893. On the other hand, 
temporary inflation can also happen for several reasons: either as a result of central banks temporarily 
reneging on their commitment to convertibility and/or printing too much money, or as a result of an 
increase in supply due to discoveries of new Gold deposits and innovations in mining technology. 
Inflationary periods have in general been short-lived although innovations in gold mining technologies and 
new mines discoveries did have longer lasting inflationary effects. For instance, major gold discoveries in 
the Klondike, South Africa, and Australia provided a large boost to money supply after 1896. As a 
consequence, the U.S. general level of prices increased at 2.5% per year over the period 1896-1914. 
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source of potential frictions for the velocity of money, which is not to say that credit 
crunches cannot cause a stalling of the velocity of money as experienced during the worst 
episode of the 2007-2010 financial crisis in the fall of 2008. The next big step has been 
the invention of the mainframe computer followed by that of credit cards. Both 
inventions ushered a new era of rapid innovation in banks’ back office operations, 
financial instruments and transaction methods as well as interbank settlements (see Table 
2). 
To sum-up, the costs savings associated with using money relative to barter are 
derived from: 
1. Economizing on the resource costs due to the lack of double coincidence of wants. 
This occurs in a barter economy. Resources are wasted due to search costs and 
storage/spoilage costs. 
2. Economizing on the resource cost to produce commodity money. In a barter 
economy, this cost is incurred repeatedly to sustain most of the stock of “mediums of 
exchanges” needed for transactions, as many of these barter goods are perishable. In a 
commodity (metallic) standard, production costs only occur for new money, and 
constitute a deadweight loss for society in the sense that resources are transferred to a 
non-productive and non-consumable goods sector of the economy. In the transition 
from barter to CM, the cost savings are getting smaller over time because the 
marginal cost of producing CM is rising. In a FM economy the cost of producing 
money is essentially zero. 
3. Economizing on the costs generated by an inefficient banking clearinghouse system. 
In a commodity money system which maintains convertibility, clearing transactions 
with physical money settlements is costly. The fractional reserve system of the past 
and our current FM system have drastically reduced these costs. 
4. Avoiding recessionary deflations: deflations caused by secular money supply 
constraints have typically being associated with economic slow downs. Guerrero and 
Parker (2006) find that a higher rate of deflation reduces the subsequent economic 
growth rate (even if it does not always lead to recession). Thus, there is reason to 
believe that deflation is bad for economic growth even if it has become a relatively 
rare experience for most developed economies in the postwar era. 
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5. Advances in transaction methods: such as credit cards and online shopping and 
banking, which boost the velocity of money. 
It seems clear that the step-wise evolution of exchange systems from barter to CM, and 
from CM to FM has provided incremental cost savings. Again, the key idea here is that 
the cost savings of using money and associated transactional innovations can be directly 
inputted in terms of avoiding loss of real GDP. Given a prevailing monetary system (CM 
or FM), going back to a lesser form of money or barter would lead to a permanent drop in 
real GDP. Let me now develop the notations for the paper: 
   
Stock of nominal money
Velocity of money
Nominal GDP
GDP deflator
Population
Real money per-capita
t
t
t
t
t
t
M
V
Y
P
N
m
=
=
=
=
=
=
Real per-capita GDP
Growth rate of money
Growth rate of velocity
Inflation rate
Population growth rate
Growth rate of real per-capita GDP
t
M
V
y
y
g
g
n
g
π
=
=
=
=
=
=
tM are aggregate nominal balances carried from the beginning of period t (time t-1) 
enabling the purchase of goods and services in period t. The variable tt
t t
Mm
PN
=  is the 
real money holdings per-capita. In this case, I consider that the relevant head count (i.e. 
per-capita) includes the population of individuals, businesses and non-federal government 
entities holding accounts at depository institutions.11 I thus define the average society 
member as a representative domestic economic agent who is a composite of all these 
categories. 
 
Definition (Transactional Cost Savings of Using Money): Given a current level of real 
per capita output ty  achieved by the economy, let 
B
ty  denote the level of real GDP/capita 
(in a barter economy) that would prevail if the institution of money (but not credit) was 
abolished; i.e. the use of the real (per-capita) stock of money  were suddenly 
suspended in period t.  I denote by 
tm
B
t t t t tT y y yA= − = ×
0 tA
 the real cost savings of using 
and associated transactional innovations, where tm 1≤ ≤  is the fraction of current 
real GDP/capita that would be lost if the economy reverted to barter. 
 
                                                 
11 I ignore the issue of demand for currency due to trade balance/current account. 
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The function  captures the current state of the transaction technology.tT 12 The larger 
the value of  the greater the advances in the transaction technology as compared to 
barter, and the greater the savings are by comparison to barter. This definition is flexible 
enough to account for various monetary regimes such as CM and FM. 
tT
 
Definition (Unit Costs Savings Function At): The per-unit-of-real-goods cost savings 
function is given by 31 2 411 1(1 ) (1 )S Lt t t t tA A R R I m
λλ λ−λ− − −= × + × + × × 1 with 3 40 ,λ λ≤ ≤ . 
 
The function tA  accounts for three key features of a transaction technology. A 
transaction technology is characterized by: 1) the medium of exchange used in the 
economy, i.e. the monetary (barter) regime; 2) the availability of substitutes for the 
medium(s) of exchange, and 3) the type of technological progress affecting one’s ability 
to transact for a given amount of real money per-capita. Feature 1) is addressed by using 
the size of real money per-capita in circulation. In that case, zero money holdings means 
that barter is in place. I assume that the function tA  has decreasing marginal returns in 
the amount of real money per-capita, which is equivalent to assuming that the per-unit-of-
money transaction (or average) cost savings function t
t
T
m
                                                
 is decreasing with the amount 
of real money per-capita. 
To model feature 2) above, the transaction cost savings function  is made to 
depend on the net cost of using money substitutes (e.g. inside money in the case of barter 
and commodity money; or credit cards in FM economy). Given my focus on the post-
1950s era in the empirical section, I only consider the effect of credit cards loans on 
transaction cost savings.
tA
13 The transaction cost savings of holding money (per unit of 
 
12 I define a transaction technology as the medium of exchange (money or barter goods) and the associated 
devices or methods used to facilitate transactions (for example credit cards are associated with fiat money). 
13 Overnight interbank lending and central bank loans to depository institutions are also factors that can 
enhance the velocity of money by facilitating interbank settlements. The demand of overnight funds to 
meet interbank settlements corresponds to unforeseen imbalances. It appears to be highly interest inelastic 
over the “normal” range of discount and federal funds rates. In the U.S., the supply of these short-term 
loans is essentially “perfectly” elastic due to the commitment of the Fed to meet the short-term 
reserve/liquidity needs (not excess reserves needs) of depository institutions at the prevailing discount rate, 
especially when the federal funds market does not. Thus, the Fed partly fulfills its role as lender of last 
resort. The equilibrium quantity of short-term loans thus can potentially adjust to any level required by 
demand shocks. A reference on the topic is Freixas et al. (2009). As the Fed has historically imposed 
administrative rationing, institutions prefer using the federal funds market during the normal course of 
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goods)  must be decreasing with the availability of more credit instruments that 
closely substitute for money.
tA
14 
In Appendix A, I analyze the interaction between the credit card market and the 
“bank” credit market. I conduct a comparative statics exercise and show that as credit 
becomes more expensive, the demand for credit cards actually expands while the net 
return on depository institutions’ assets declines. The reason for the expansion of credit 
cards is that consumers and businesses view the offered “high” rates on credit cards as 
price ceilings. They believe they can control the effective interest they pay on the loan 
over the grace period by avoiding finance charges (Ausubel, 1991). Thus, while other 
sources of credit are becoming more expensive, that is not necessarily the case for credit 
cards if customers are disciplined enough to avoid finance charges. Putting these 
elements together, I show that there must be a positive relation between the cost savings 
 and the financial sector’s net asset returns, holding real money balances constant. tA
I assume that the log of the cost savings function, or percentage deviation of cost 
savings from trend, varies positively with depository financial institutions’ net return on 
assets. The net return on assets is captured by the geometric compounded average return 
of the long-term interest rate LtR  and short-term interest rate 
S
tR , and where the 
exponents represent the respective weights of assets (loans) and liabilities (deposits) in 
the financial institutions’ balance sheet.  
                                                                                                                                                 
business and the Fed obviously intends to conduct an effective monetary policy when targeting the federal 
funds rate. Implicitly, the view taken in this paper is that it is the supply of excess reserves that is a positive 
function of the funds rate and which restricts the expansion of the money supply. 
14 There is no reason why credit cards could not exist and function properly in a pure barter economy. But 
of course the advent of credit cards has raised the velocity of fiat money. Assuming that money holdings do 
not change, this leads to an increase of aggregate demand and real GDP/capita, at least in the short-run. To 
get back to Tobin’s (1992) point though, new transactional technologies have enabled large amounts and 
variety of goods to be transacted. Thus, it is hard to dissociate the use of credit cards with the achievements 
of our modern economies in terms of high levels of real GDP/capita. In other words, any transaction 
technology should be viewed as an integral part of the aggregate production function. Hence, while the per-
unit of goods transaction cost savings is decreasing, the total transaction cost savings function should be 
increasing in the availability of credit cards as they allow larger levels of real GDP to be sustained. Holding 
the amount of real money per-capita constant in the transaction cost savings function is possible in the 
presence of credit expansion when credit cards are used as a pure substitute to money holdings. However, 
as Stauffer (2003) points out, the majority of card users carry a positive balance on average, which boosts 
M1. Also, it is important to recognize that as the net asset return rises due for example to a reduction in 
short-term rates, the quantity of other credit products (e.g. mortgages) will rise and substitute for credit card 
loans within the financial sectors’ loan portfolio. 
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In general, depository institutions borrow short-term and leverage-up to lend at long-
term interest rates. The institutions’ net return on assets thus can be proxied by 
1 2(1 )
S
t t
LR Rλ λ⎡ − −⎣ ⎤⎦ . In this context, the parameter 1λ  = 2λ− >1 naturally represents the 
long-term leverage of depository institutions; i.e. the ratio of total assets over equity. For 
example, a value 1λ  = 2 means that institutions borrow another 100% of their equity at 
short-term rates to double up the return on long-term loans.15 
The final feature of a transaction cost savings function is addressed by introducing the 
variable tI , which represents an index of technical progress. At first glance, the unit cost 
savings function tA  being decreasing with the index of progress is counterintuitive. 
However, recall that both the index of progress and real GDP/capita are variables in the 
total cost savings function . A surge of technological progress while holding real 
GDP/capita constant implies that the use of other factors such as labor input must be 
shrinking. In that case, the cost savings relative to barter are actually diminishing for 
people, as they have more free time on their hand and better technology, which reduces 
the cost of bilateral searches, for example by using faster computers to engage in barter. 
Notwithstanding, this scenario does not really arise in this model as I assume that 
technical progress is labor augmenting. Hence, progress tracks real GDP/capita (labor 
productivity) or 
tT
t tI y= .16 
Whether the cost savings function  is increasing in real GDP/capita then depends 
on the net effect of real GDP per-capita growth via the income and the technical progress 
tT
                                                 
15 While it is beyond the scope of this paper, an analysis of inside money substitutes; i.e. IOUs used to 
settle interbank payments in a pure CM economy can be accommodated by my transaction cost function. In 
that case, the portfolio weights should be equal to one another in absolute value; i.e. (1- 1λ ) = 2λ >0, and 
thus the transaction cost savings is a decreasing function of L St tR R⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦ ; i.e. the lower the profit from 
lending to non-bank customers, the more willing banks are willing to lend to each others. This is expected 
in a pure CM economy, with no credit product that can easily substitute for money. Overall, the intuition 
behind my results is similar to Wicksell’s (1936) analysis of money velocity that revolves around the 
development of credit as a substitute for commodity money. In his case however, money is exclusively 
seen as metallic currency or gold. Wicksell was later abundantly criticized for treating bank notes and bank 
deposits as different from money. 
16 I recognize that along a steady-state growth path for economy, it is essentially impossible to separate out 
the economic effects of real GDP per-capita growth vs. that of labor-augmenting technical progress on 
transaction costs savings, as in the long-run, these two variables are inextricably tied. My analysis does not 
focus on transitional dynamics, but on steady-state growth. In that case the sole engine of economic growth 
is technical progress. 
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channels. This in turn depends on the sign of the parameter 3λ . I interpret the parameter 
3λ  as an indicator of the type of technical progress in the transaction technology. I 
distinguish between regime-biased or regime-neutral innovations. Regime-biased 
technical progress reduces transaction costs associated with a specific monetary regime. 
Biased progress can be of two subtypes: 1) New-regime biased 3 0λ > : technological 
progress enhances the efficiency of the current monetary regime more than barter; 2) 
Old-regime biased 3 0λ < : barter receives a greater efficiency boost than the current form 
of money, or alternatively, technological progress cannot prevent rising costs of 
producing money.17 Regime-neutral progress ( 3 0λ = ) allows all transactional systems 
(from barter to the current form of money) to benefit equally from a new technology. In 
other words, the efficiency gap is constant. This is obviously a knife-edge case. Table 2 
summarizes some of the highlights in the history of major innovations that transformed 
transaction technologies over the 1959-2007 period. There, I also offer a rough 
classification of each innovation according to whether it is neutral or biased.18 
 
3. The Optimal Quantity and Velocity of Money 
In a classic paper, Friedman (1969) demonstrates that the socially optimal amount of 
money to hold is at the point where the marginal benefits of holding money equal its 
opportunity cost (nominal interest rate) plus the marginal cost of producing money. In a 
fiat money economy, the marginal cost of money production is zero. Friedman assumes 
that economic agents have a satiation point for holding money, which means that the 
marginal gain becomes zero beyond a certain threshold. Consequently, the only way the 
                                                 
1
17 It is possible that more primitive types of money also receive an efficiency boost. Assuming A > 0 rules 
out the case where the old type of money leapfrogs the newer type. 
18 Note that the cost savings function must satisfy 0 tA≤ ≤ . Using the Quantity Theory of Money 
equation expressed as t t tM V Y× = , the real stock of money per-capita is given by t t tm y V= . Thus, the 
function tA  can also be written as 3 3
11(1 )t t t tA A R V m 4t1 2(1 )
S LR λ λ λ− −= × + × ×λ λ− −× + . As long as the velocity 
of money is not falling to zero and the stock of real money per-capita is not declining, the condition 
3 4λ λ<  plus the proper bound on the constant A are sufficient to insure that 0 A 1t≤ ≤ . In the limit case 
where money velocity drops to zero, this constraint can still be met as long as real money per-capita grows 
faster than the speed of velocity decline. 
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marginal gain of holding money can equate its marginal cost is by having monetary 
authorities set the short-term interest rate to zero.19 
Even though Friedman (1969) does enumerate the advantages of money over barter, 
he does not explicitly incorporate these benefits in his analysis. Presumably, these 
benefits do not have to be analyzed separately as they are already included in the 
pecuniary services of money. However, Friedman implicitly assumes that a full-blown 
monetary system is already institutionalized. The average household not holding money 
does not imply that money is completely absent from the economy as a medium of 
exchange, and that this household has to resort to barter. In fact, economic agents can 
recover money by selling goods or less liquid assets. 
Here, on the other hand, I quantify the marginal costs and benefits of using money 
relative to barter. Money must fulfill the same basic transactional services as barter in 
addition to removing the frictions caused by barter. Indeed, there are sizable transactional 
frictions associated with holding goods for barter rather than using money as discussed in 
the previous section.20 The frictions associated with barter are possibly removable not by 
using a special tax scheme or setting the short-term interest to zero, but rather by 
achieving a sufficiently high level of technological progress. 
To set-up the first result, it is also important to stress that there is a relative 
opportunity cost of holding money as compared to holding goods for barter. The 
credit/lending technology is less efficient in a barter economy due to storage and spoilage 
costs. Given a rate of interest R promised in a monetary economy, if the monetary system 
suddenly collapses, the expected return in a barter economy becomes (1+R)(1−δ) −1, 
where 0 1δ≤ <  is the per-dollars storage and spoilage cost.21 Thus, the relative 
opportunity cost of holding an amount of money (or goods equivalent to the amount of 
                                                 
19 Hetzel (2007) points out from the title Friedman (1969) chose for the section of the book on the optimal 
rule, that Friedman did not appear to intend for this rule to serve as an actual guide for monetary policy. 
20 Along Friedman’s line, Wolman (1997) focuses on individual money holdings. He considers the 
marginal savings in terms of wage earnings due to less time spent transacting. Lucas (2000) also focuses 
part of his paper on developing a model that incorporates a shopping time constraint, again within a 
monetized economy. 
21 I assume that spoilage costs affect interest paid and principal in a pure barter economy, so that 
(1+R)(1−δ) −1≥0. This is similar to comparing (in the standard macroeconomic growth model) the interest 
rate in an economy where capital depreciates vs. the case of zero depreciation. With zero depreciation, 
(1+R) equals the marginal productivity of capital. With positive depreciation the new rate is (1+Rnew) = 
(1+R−δ). However it becomes (1+Rnew) = (1+R)(1−δ). if the interest earned (in goods terms) is subjected to 
spoilage as well, for example due to having to store principal and interest before payment. 
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money) for trade is therefore higher in a monetized economy than in a barter economy by 
the amount δ(1+R). 
 
Proposition 1: Assume that there exists a representative unit basket of goods and a 
quantity tB  of that basket satisfying trades in a barter economy. Assume that the 
consumption in autarky  is related to the quantity of baskets bartered as follows 
; where the velocity  applies to a monetized economy at the point 
of collapse, i.e. experiencing a level of real output per-capita equal to . Further assume 
that the parameters of the transaction cost savings function satisfy 
A
tC
1⎡= −⎣A Bt tC V B⎤⎦ t
4
1BtV ≥
B
ty
3λ λ< . The optimal 
quantity of money per-capita and optimal velocity for an economy producing ty are given 
by: 
 
 34 1
4 4
(1 )1ln( ) ln ( ) ln( )L St t
Am R R λλ λλ δ λ λ
× −⎡ ⎤= + − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ 4t t
y  (1) 
 
 31
4 4 4 4
1ln( ) ln ( ) (1 ) ln( )
(1 )
L S
t t tV R RA
λλδ
λ λ λ λ
⎡ ⎤= − − + −⎢ ⎥× −⎣ ⎦ t
y  (2) 
 
Proof: Assuming that the opportunity cost of money is given by the short-term interest 
rate StR , the standard optimality condition determining the optimal money holdings  is 
Net Marginal Benefits of Real Money Holdings − 
*
tm
S
tR  = 0. On the other hand, the services 
that money renders must at least be equal to the transaction services obtained by holding 
goods for barter, as money is an extension of barter. In other words, money services can 
be separated into two additive components: 1) the same basic transactional services that 
goods held for barter provide, plus 2) the reduction of transactional frictions caused by 
barter.22 
The general optimum quantity of money condition above can be re-written by 
segregating the marginal benefits due to barter and those incremental savings due to 
instituting a monetized economy at the point of collapse:  Net Marginal Benefit of 
Holding Barter Goods −  (1+ StR )(1−δ) +1 + [Net Marginal Benefit of Real Money 
Holdings -Net Marginal Benefit of Holding Barter Goods] − δ (1+ StR ) = 0; where the 
                                                 
22 Here, I assume that the marginal benefits of holding barter goods are net of current spoilage costs and 
that the transaction cost savings from using money are net of the cost of producing money. 
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bracketed term corresponds to the marginal cost savings associated with real money 
holdings relative to barter, i.e. t
t
T
m
∂
∂ . 
Assume that the institution of money collapses and the economy suddenly reverts 
back to barter. The quantity of money equation musts hold true at the point where the 
economy transitions into barter.23 People must be indifferent between holding a given 
amount of real money  and bartering and thus tm
B B A
t t t t tm V y C B= = + ; with  
representing the velocity of money in that economy. Here, the average real output is the 
sum of consumption in autarky and the representative basket of goods held for barter 
1BtV ≥
A
tC
tB  per-capita, which includes goods purchased by consumers and producers. At the point 
of collapse, people must be able to purchase the total consumption, which splits into i) 
what they can eventually produce and consume in autarky plus ii) additional goods they 
are looking to barter for. 
I assume that the consumption in autarky is related to the amount of goods bartered in 
the following way . This condition is an equilibrium resource constraint. 
Each real unit of money must be ultimately redeemed against its real good (barter) 
equivalent only once. Of course, the last person left holding the (money) bag loses, if 
money is viewed as worthless. As Ritter (1995) points out, there are two possible ways 
out of this conundrum. First, the government maintains the convertibility of money into 
goods/commodities, for example by raising tax revenues in kind (i.e. non-perishable 
commodities). The other, is that if convertibility is not maintained, the government 
commits to not use seignorage, so that money can be stored away and used again 
sometimes in the future. Another reason why money still has value, is that autarky 
production has not started yet, so that people do not have the necessary spectrum of 
goods to barter effectively. For example, State and federal employees or software 
engineers and teachers would probably have a hard time bartering the services they 
produce, and so some economic activities would naturally be impeded. The raison d’etre 
1A Bt tC V B⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ t
                                                 
23 A case in which money and barter can co-exist for a while is that of hyperinflation. A good reference for 
a model of the transition from barter to fiat money is Ritter (1995). Ritter’s model is based on Kyatoki and 
Wright (1993). 
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for the velocity  being greater than one here is to accommodate this purchase of 
“autarky” goods before autarky production begins. This latter condition combined with 
the quantity equation implies 
B
tV
t tm B= .24 
In a pure barter economy, the net marginal benefit of holding one additional unit of 
real barter goods held as inventory is the value of the incremental goods to be purchased, 
which are not available in autarky. At the optimum, this value must be equal to the 
opportunity cost (interest rate net of spoilage due to storage) or (1+ StR )(1−δ) −1 . The 
representative basket with B units of barter goods provides a utility of U(B) due to 
welfare improving trades. The optimality condition that determines the optimal holdings 
of barter goods *tB  is ( )( )1 1 1St
t
U B R
B
δ∂
*
( )
t
t
B
= + − −∂ . The optimality of the quantity of 
unitary basket *tB  must be satisfied independently from the monetized economy.  
Because during the sudden transition to barter, the condition tm tB= holds, the optimal 
real money balances must also satisfy the same optimality condition with respect to 
providing equivalent transaction services to that offered by the basket of real barter 
goods. Because money holdings  were optimized before the collapse of the fiat money 
economy, this leads to m . Hence, the optimum quantity of money  can be 
determined simply by equating the marginal benefits vs. the opportunity cost of holding 
money in excess of those generated by barter; that is: 
*
tm
*
tB
*
t = *tm
 31 1 414(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
S Lt
t t t t
t
T A R R y m
m
λλ λ λλ δ− −∂ = × − × + × + × × = +∂
S
tR  (3) 
Rearranging the terms and taking the logs leads to expressing real money balances as 
(1). From the QTM equation, the real stock of money per-capita is given by tt
t
ym
V
= . 
Using this last equation and taking the logs, the velocity of money can finally be 
                                                 
24 My approach implicitly necessitates the presence of a medium of account in the barter economy (unit 
basket of goods), which can translate into the real money unit. For example, the medium of account could 
be a mixture of the reference baskets in the CPI and PPI indexes, and the unit of account is 1 unit of that 
mixed basket. For a discussion of the difference between medium of exchange vs. medium of account vs. 
unit of account, see McCallum (2003). 
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expressed as (2) above. The assumption 3 4λ λ<  guarantees that the velocity of money 
rises with real GDP/capita, our index of progress. QED. 
 
The optimal velocity of money given in equation (2) is increasing in per-capita 
income due to technical progress and decreasing in the return differential ( )L St tR R− . 
Recall that the spread ( )L St tR R−
(
  shrinking is equivalent to the net return to assets 
dropping while the quantity offered of credit cards is actually increasing. The optimal 
velocity being decreasing with )Lt
S
tR R− makes economic sense because the velocity of 
money rises with the expansion of credit cards in the economy. 
The optimal quantity of money given by equation (1) is increasing in per-capita 
income and decreasing in the short-term interest rate as one should expect. On the other 
hand, it is increasing in the long-term interest rate. Again, this effect is due to the fact that 
holding the amount of money per-capita constant, depository institutions are expanding 
the velocity of money via supplying more credit cards loans. The novelty is the inclusion 
of two new key parameters in the optimum quantity of money equation. These are the 
degree of bias in technical progress and the leverage ratio of depository institutions. 
Adrian and Shin (2009) for example, make a strong case in favor of including leverage as 
a variable in monetary policy rules. Here, leverage is constant as my focus in on a long-
run equilibrium. 
Equation (1) is consistent with the semi-log money demand function used by Bailey 
(1956) and Friedman (1969), by contrast with the double-log schedule preferred by Lucas 
(2000). Here, the per-capita real income elasticity of money demand is expected to be 
positive and close to zero, due to the fact that progress in the transaction technology is 
new-regime biased. The optimum quantity of money is a function of the long-term and 
short-term interest rates, which is unusual in the literature, but defended by Brunner and 
Metzler (1989). 
Contrary to several recent models replicating Friedman’s (1969) optimum quantity of 
money result, I do not assume satiation in this model in order to avoid the unrealistic 
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prediction of infinite money holdings at zero interest rates.25 This is simply a standard 
feature of the semi-log schedule I use here, that a finite level of cash is held at a zero 
nominal interest. The (short-term) interest elasticity of money demand is 1 4/
S
tRλ λ⎡ ⎤− ×⎣ ⎦ , 
which is decreasing as the interest rate falls to zero. This simple result is in agreement 
with Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin’s (1996) findings. They use a cross-sectional data on 
asset holdings of U.S. households in 1989 and find that the interest elasticity is very low 
when interest rates are low. They state on page 41: “Our prediction of low interest 
elasticity at low interest rates is crucial, for example, for the evaluation of the welfare 
costs of inflation. The consumer surplus approach applied by Bailey (1956), Lucas 
(1994) and others show that the welfare cost of inflation hinges fundamentally on the 
money demand elasticity at low interest rates.” Marty (1999) also criticizes Lucas’ choice 
on the basis that it artificially inflates welfare gains since the level of cash balances goes 
to infinity as the interest rate approaches zero. 
My model is most related to the literature on innovation and money. Ireland (1994) 
argues that the effects of economic growth on the payments system can be substantial. In 
his model, the ratio M2/M1 rises steadily over time and the demand for M1 becomes 
increasingly interest-elastic as the economy grows. The fact that M2/M1 rises is fully 
consistent with my hypothesis that substitutes of narrow money enhance the velocity of 
narrow money. Ireland (1995) models the process of financial innovations as carrying a 
fixed cost. In order to innovate, the opportunity cost of holding cash balances has to be 
higher than a threshold level that might be greater than current interest rates. The model 
is based on Dotsey’s (1984) framework in which financial innovations are endogenous 
and treated as investment projects. In a different vein, Jafarey and Masters (2003) study 
the impact of innovation on the velocity of money within the framework of a search/ 
matching model. When the matching technology is improved they show that the velocity 
of money is affected positively. 
                                                 
25 Wolman (1997) assumes satiation in money holdings in order to reproduce Friedman’s (1969) result. 
Mulligan and Salai-Martin (1997) assert that the assumption of satiation can be done away with in their 
model as long as seignorage falls as the interest rate drops to zero. In other words, the stock of money does 
not grow faster than the speed of decline of the interest rate. Some cash-in-advance models appear to 
predict Friedman’s result without resorting to assuming satiation. However, they assume that frictionless 
barter is achievable as a first best solution. Recently, a new string of the literature integrates market 
frictions in hybrid models combining general equilibrium and search models (Aruoba et al., 2007). These 
models reach conclusions at odds with Friedman’s (1969) recommendation. 
 19
 4. Data and Testing Methodology 
In this section, I test the long-term optimal velocity of money relation (2) for the U.S. on 
a quarterly basis over the period Jan. 1959- Oct. 2007. The variables used are real GDP 
per-capita calculated using real GDP (GDPC96; 2005 dollars, seasonally adjusted annual 
rate) from BEA and U.S. population is monthly data (POP) from the Census Bureau that 
is matched with real GDP observations on a quarterly basis. Long-term interest rates are 
monthly rates based on the long-term bonds series (LTGOVTBD) from the Fed’s BOG, 
which is the unweighted average yield on all outstanding bonds neither due nor callable 
in less than 10 years. The series stops in June 2000. I complete the long-term bond series 
by using the constant maturity (monthly) 10-year Treasury yield (GS10) from Q3 2000 to 
Q4 2007. I use three alternate money stock measures related to M1. The first measure is 
M1 from the Fed’s BOG (M1SL), which is monthly and seasonally adjusted data. The 
other two measures are M1RS and M1S available on a seasonally adjusted basis only up 
until the end of 2007. This data is from Cynamon, Dutkowsky and Jones’s website at 
http://www.sweepmeasures.com/. 
Since the 1970s depository institutions have been able to lower their reserve 
requirements on commercial demand deposits by sweeping deposits into other 
instruments, but initially the size of these operations was never great due to the lack of 
computer speed, given that the sweeps had to be returned at regular intervals. Since 1994, 
depository institutions have been able to lower their reserve requirements for retail 
deposits by using automated computer programs to move inventories of checkable 
deposits overnight into money market depository accounts (MMDAs) and money market 
mutual funds (MMMFs), which are not subject to reserve requirements. 
These operations known as sweep account programs have led to a situation where M1 
is underestimating actual narrow money. Anderson (2003) points out that sweep 
programs are initiated by banks not by account depositors. Depositors optimize their cash 
holdings with the understanding that the whole balances are available from the bank at 
any point in time for transaction needs. Thus, it makes sense to include sweeps in a 
measure of narrow money. 
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Recently, Anderson (1997) and Dutkowsky and al. (2003) estimated the magnitude of 
these sweep programs, and in particular Dutkowsky et al. (2006) developed M1RS and 
M1S, the two new adjusted measures for M1. The new aggregate M1RS equals M1 + 
(swept funds from retail programs), which are funds with unrestricted transaction 
properties. M1S equals M1RS + (swept funds from commercial demand deposits sweep 
programs), which contains all sweeps.26 
By definition, the actual velocity of money is tt
t
YV
M
= . Figure 1 shows the velocities 
of all three measures of narrow money and Figure 2 shows the velocity of M1 in relation 
to real GDP/capita growth. Visually, Figure 2 illustrates that there seems to be a strong 
connection between the log of M1 velocity and the log of real GDP per-capita growth 
over the period. On the other hand, from Figure 1, such a connection appears to break 
down with M1RS and M1S, as these money aggregates expanded rapidly after the early 
1990s. 
I test the long-run optimal velocity equation (2) using the following specification for 
the equilibrium relation: 
  (4) 1 2 3 4 5ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) 5971 1
S L
t t t tV R R y dα β β β β β= + × + × + × + × + × tSM
My goal is to estimate the key coefficients ln( )α , 1β , 2β , and 3β . These coefficients are 
related to the optimal velocity equation (2) in the following way: 
4 4
1ln( ) ln
(1 )A
δα λ λ
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟× −⎝ ⎠
; 11
4
λβ λ= >0; 2 1β β= − <0 and 
3
3
4
1 λβ λ= −
                                                
>0. I employ 
Johansen’s (1988, 1991 and 1995) Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) approach. 
The reason is that the variables may have a unit root and are possibly cointegrated. First, I 
confirm that all the variables are I(1).27 I also test the log of velocity series for structural 
 
26 Cynamon, Dutkowsky and Jones’s database tracks commercial demand deposit programs only after 
1991. Thus, M1S may be slightly biased downward prior to 1991. 
27I run Augmented Dickey Fuller tests with trends for the log of velocity of money (M1, M1RS and M1S) 
as well as for SM1 and the log of real GDP per-capita, and with drift for the two interest rates. In all cases 
the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, except for the T-
Bill rate, which is rejected at the 5% level but not at the 1% level. The detailed results are obtainable from 
the author. The other possible issue is the collinearity between the two interest rates used here. However, 
rather than imposing restrictions, I let the VECM structure speak for itself and determine whether there is 
an independent cointegrating equation governing the behavior of these two rates, with short-term 
adjustments away from equilibrium. The empirical results do not support that contention. Any short term 
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breaks. Using Clemente et al. (1998) I test for the presence of unit roots with at most two 
breaks. I find that indeed two breaks are present in the log of velocity of M1RS and M1S. 
Based on whether the test is for additive outliers (AO) or innovational outlier (IO), I find 
that for M1RS the break dates are (Q2 1976; Q2 1994) for AO and (Q3 1971; Q3 1991) 
for IO. In the case of M1S, the break dates are (Q2 1976; Q2 1994) in the AO case, and 
(Q3-1971; Q3 1991) in the IO case. Interestingly, one of the two extreme break dates Q3 
1971 represents the end of the gold standard for the U.S. economy and the other Q2 1994 
is one quarter after retail sweep programs began. I choose Q3 1971 as the earliest break 
date in the analysis for both M1RS and M1S. For M1RS I choose the beginning of the 
retail sweep program or Q1-1994. For M1S I choose Q3 1991 for the second break, that 
is, when total sweeps started being recorded. 
The idea behind Johansen’s (1988, 1991, 1995) method is to estimate the full 
dynamic structure of the relationship between these variables, while at the same time 
being able to separate out the long-run from the short-run dynamics. In this paper, I am 
only interested in studying the long-run dynamics part of the VECM. The set up is 
( ) 11 1
1
w 5971 w 7982
p
t t i t i
i
x x x d d2 tθ β μ γ
−
− −
=
Δ = + + Γ Δ + + + +∑
( )ln( ), , , ln( ), 5971, 1S Lt t t t t tx V R R y d SM
ε . Where the vector 
′=  is (6x1), θ  is a (6xr) matrix representing the 
speed of adjustment, and β  is a (rx6) matrix representing the parameters of the 
cointegrating equations ( )1txβ μ− +
iΓ
. The number of cointegrating relations is r. The 
matrices  are (6x6) and p is the number of lags in the short-term dynamics. I restrict the 
cointegrating equation to be stationary around constant means μ , which is a (rx1) vector. 
I also allow for a stochastic trend in levels by including a constant (6x1) vector γ  in the 
short-run dynamics part of the VECM. 
The (6x1) vector  is associated with the dummy variable d5971, which accounts 
for a possible break in the times series of narrow money velocity due to the transition 
from the gold standard to pure fiat money economy after the Nixon administration ended 
the dollars-gold peg. It also accounts for the reduction in the volatility of real GDP/capita 
1w
                                                                                                                                                 
relationship between the two rates will be uncovered by the short-term dynamics of the VECM and thus 
separated from the cointegrating relation (4). 
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post gold standard era. This dummy variable takes a value of 1 from Q1 1959 to Q3 1971 
and 0 otherwise. 
The variable SM1 is the ratio of sweeps divided by M1.28 This variable is used in the 
VECM only when the velocity of money is calculated using M1S or M1RS, for the 
purpose of accounting for structural breaks in these series. The SM1 variable spans 
January 1994 to October 2007 for M1RS and October 1991 to October 2007 for M1S. 
The (6x1) vector  is associated with a seasonal dummy variable d7982, which 
accounts for period covering the high inflation of 1979 and the 1982 recession under 
Volcker’s tenure. This dummy is only assumed to affect the short-term dynamics of the 
VECM. For the sake of simplicity, I assume for now that the number of cointegrating 
relations is r = 1, which I verify later. Using Johansen’s (1995) normalization procedure, 
so that the coefficient on  is normalized to 1, the matrix 
2w
ln( )tV β  can be expressed as 
1 2(1, , , ,3, 4 5 )β β β β= − − − − −β β  and ln( )μ α= − , which leads to the same form as 
equation (4) above. 
 
5. Test Results with M1 and Other Measures of Narrow Money 
Table 3 presents the results for several versions of the cointegrating equation (4) 
presented above. I test various lag structures as well. Each specific version presented in 
Table 3 minimizes either the AIC (Akaike criterion), the BIC (Bayesian information 
criterion) or the HQ (Hannan-Quinn information criterion) across possible lags from 1 to 
4. All equations included in Table 3 have a cointegration rank of one; i.e. only one 
cointegrating relation exists in each case.29 All coefficients for the long-run equilibrium 
are significant at least at the 99% level, except in a couple of instances. Overall, the basic 
model is supported for each measure of narrow money used here. 
For M1, the best result supporting the model is when the dummy variable d5971 is 
present in the model and the VECM lag = 2. In that case, the AIC, BIC and Chi2 statistics 
                                                 
28 The definition is different for M1RS and M1S. For M1RS, the variable SM1 only includes retail sweeps. 
For M1S it includes total sweeps. 
29 I excluded instances of rank equal to 2, which occurred mostly when the number of lags equaled 4. These 
multiple cointegrating equations were economically meaningless. I also ran post estimation diagnostics on 
the VECM. Overall, the presented equations were part of VECMs which had stable roots, with normally 
distributed disturbances (except for the short term dynamics of the log of real GDP/capita), and exhibited 
some residual autocorrelation at all lags up to lag 4. The results are available from the author upon request. 
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are minimized. The estimate for the elasticity of real income per-capita is 0.85 and the 
estimate of the leverage coefficient is 14.91 (for RS) and -15.09 (for RL). These two 
coefficients are nearly equal in magnitude as predicted by the theory. 
Interestingly, the value of these coefficients is close to the actual historical leverage 
of depository institutions. Figure 3 graphs the actual leverage for depository institutions 
over the period 1959-2007.30 Since the late 1980s, the leverage has drastically dropped. 
This corresponds to the adoption of the several rounds of Basel accords regarding capital 
adequacy ratios, starting in 1988. The mean of the time series equals 15.01, which is 
close to the leverage coefficients found above. However, recall that the estimated 
parameter is the ratio of leverage 1λ over the parameter 4λ  so that 11
4
λβ λ= . In this case, 
there is reason to believe that the coefficient on the long-term rate is more exact, as it 
does not suffer from the distortion created by the introduction of NOW account in the 
early 1980s. The introduction of these accounts made the decision to hold cash less 
sensitive to short-term interest rates. Thus, I use 2 15.09β =  and 1λ = 15.01. The 
coefficient 4λ  can be estimated at 0.99. This indicates that the elasticity of real money 
(1− 4λ ) in the transaction cost savings function is very close to zero.31 
The results with M1RS and M1S are not as strongly supportive but they are still 
consistent with my findings for M1. In the case of M1RS the best result in support of the 
theory is when the VECM lag = 4 and the dummy d5971 is used in conjunction with the 
variable SM1, i.e. retail sweeps divided by M1. In that case, the long-run relationship 
shows an elasticity of income equal to 0.84. The values for leverage coefficient are 
respectively 12.64 (for RS) and -13.19 (for RL). The two coefficients are still close to each 
other in absolute value. Equally good with respect to the AIC criterion is the model that 
includes the dummy d7982. In that case the coefficient is 11.43 (for RS), -12.82 (for RL) 
and 0.91 for the income elasticity. The best result for M1S, which minimizes the AIC 
                                                 
30 I consider that leverage ratios with a value above 100 are outliers, and therefore are removed from the 
sample. These are banks and financial institutions with the following NAICS codes: 522110 commercial 
banks, 522120 savings institutions, 522130 credit unions and 522190 other depository credit intermediation 
institutions. After 1999, I add other institutions due to the 1999 banking deregulation. The additional codes 
are: 522210, 220, 291, 292, 294, 390; 523220, 524126, 127 and 210. 
31 I discuss later in this section why M1 is a better choice to capture the actual leverage parameter. 
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criterion is with a lag = 4 and including the d5971 dummy and the ratio of total sweeps 
over M1. In that case, the income elasticity is 0.89 and the two leverage coefficients are 
respectively 13.70 (for RS) and -13.90 (for RL).32 
Taking the average of the four estimates for each measure of narrow money, my point 
estimate for the coefficient 3 41 /λ λ−  = 0.8725, so that 3λ  = 0.12 and technical progress 
in the transaction technology is slightly new-regime biased. By the same token, I derive 
an average estimate for the constant A in the per-unit transaction cost savings function 
that equals 1.1. This is assuming that the depreciation (spoilage) rate in a barter economy 
has a value around 0.45% per year which is on the low side as compared to a rate of 1% 
per year estimated from grain agriculture in today’s rural China (Park, 2006), which is the 
only estimate I found in the literature. Under this assumption, the per-unit transaction 
cost savings function At is less than 1 over the sample period, as required by definition. 
The reason I include the variable SM1 in the model is to account for the break in the 
two series after 1991 and 1994, respectively when commercial demand deposits and retail 
sweep programs were instituted. Algebraically it is easy to show that:  
Retail Sweeps( ) ( )
M1
Ln VRS Ln V= −  ( ) 1Ln V SM= − . That is, the log of the velocity of 
M1RS equals the log of the velocity of M1 minus SM1. The same identity holds when 
M1RS is replaced by M1S. In the case of M1RS with a lag = 4, the coefficient on the 
SM1 variable is not equal to 1 but rather it is ─0.69. This means that the variable SM1 is 
having a distorting impact on other variables in the cointegration equation. An increase in 
the SM1 ratio correlates with a lower income elasticity and a lower leverage than would 
be generated by M1 alone. 
Even though computer software executes tasks faster and more efficiently, depository 
institutions still have to return swept funds back to the account they were swept from at 
set intervals, due to regulations and customer cash needs. Thus, as institutions optimize to 
keep the sweeps as large as they can, the value of sweeps cannot outpace the value of 
deposits in the long-run, and thus sweeps must become a constant fraction of narrow 
money. Figure 4 visually shows that the ratio of retail sweeps to aggregate M1RS has 
                                                 
32 I run VECM “control” experiments without dummy variables and as can be seen from the bottom half of 
Table 3, none of the experiments conform to the predictions of the theory and there is no discernable 
pattern for any of the money measures. 
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been leveling off over time. As the ratio converges to a constant, sweep programs will 
only have an intercept effect to lower the velocity of money. Sweep programs should 
then have no “perverse” effect on the income elasticity, but may still impact the leverage 
parameter at the margin. In Figure 4, however, total sweeps as a percentage of M1S do 
not exhibit that leveling-off pattern… yet! 
I find that the velocity elasticity with respect to the short-term interest variable is 
smaller than the elasticity with respect to long-term interest, for M1, M1RS and M1S. 
One explanation is that since NOW accounts were instituted after 1981. These are 
checking-type accounts that pay interest, with some restrictions however, as for-profit 
corporations are excluded from opening these accounts. As a result, the (short-term) 
opportunity cost of holding cash balances is lower than it was before. 
As sweep programs distort the relationship between required reserves ratio and 
demand deposits, it turns out that reverting to M1 as the measure of narrow money does 
actually help to uncover a stable long-run relationship between banks’ actual leverage 
ratios and the velocity of money, as all M1 funds are subject to the Fed statutory reserve 
requirements and to the capital adequacy ratio rules from the 1988 Basel and later 
accords.33 
Because institutions are able to shelter some of their assets from regulatory 
requirements, they are effectively able to leverage themselves at a higher level than if all 
assets in M1RS or M1S were counted. This means that the leverage ratio associated with 
M1 should be closer to actual ratios, and the estimates associated with M1RS and M1S 
should be lower as compared to M1. Furthermore, the Basel accords are enforced over 
the entire asset base of financial institutions, whether they use sweeps or not. Given that 
assets are risk-weighted to compute the required leverage ratios, the minimum of 8% 
(equity/assets) will lead to an effective leverage ratio that is slightly higher than 12.5 
(inverse of 8%) but also lower than the historical average of 15.01, which is what I find 
for the leverage estimates using M1RS and M1S. 
                                                 
33 Interestingly, as more lenient reserve requirement rules were enacted since the 1990s, one should have 
expected leverage to increase in depository institutions, but in fact one observes the opposite in Figure 3. 
This might be due to the counteracting effect of the Basel Accords regarding capital adequacy, especially 
the dip after 1990. 
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Many empirical studies have applied cointegration methods pioneered by Engle and 
Granger (1987) to study long run U.S. money demand. Examples are Hetzel (1989) who 
finds a stable relation for M2. King, Plosser, Stock, and Watson (1991) also find support 
for cointegration with M2 and the short term interest rate. Baba, Hendry and Starr (1992) 
find support for a cointegrated money demand model with either M1 or M2. In a 
comprehensive study, Carlson, Hoffman, Keen, and Rasche (2000) document that a 
stable relationship between money, output and opportunity costs prevailed in the U.S. 
until the late nineties. On the other hand, Miyao (1996) studies M2 from 1959 to 1993 
and concludes that M2 is not a useful intermediate target for monetary policy in the 
1990s. 
A recent wave of articles examines the new measures of narrow money M1RS and 
M1S developed by Dutkowsky et al. (2006). Dutkowsky at al. test the existence of a 
long-run demand relationship over 1959-2002 using M1, M1RS and M1S. They do not 
include a measure of progress in their equation. They assume that the income elasticity of 
demand is unitary, which means that the velocity only depends on the rate of interest, a 
standard assumption in the literature. Not surprisingly, their best result is achieved when 
using M1S, which has the least amount of trending amongst the three alternate measures 
of narrow money. Ireland (2008) extends the work of Lucas (2000) and uses M1RS to 
measure the welfare cost of inflation. His conclusion weighs in favor of a semi-log 
formulation for the optimum quantity of money. 
 
6. A Constant Money Growth Rule and a Near 2% Inflation Target 
To derive the optimal long-run inflation rate, I combine my derived optimal velocity of 
money with a Friedman’s (1960) k-percent rule for monetary policy. I assume that 
monetary authorities use a naïve Friedman k-percent rule in the sense that velocity is 
treated as a random walk with zero drift (Bordo and Jonung, 1987) so that money supply 
is set to grow at the same pace as real GDP capita in the long-run. 
 
Proposition 2: In a steady-state, assuming that a naïve Friedman k-percent rule applies; 
that is  and that transactional innovations are new-regime biased on average 
(
M yg g n= +
3 0λ ≥ ), then the long-term rate of inflation is constant and equals the per-capita income 
elasticity times the long-term real GDP/capita growth 3 4(1 / ) ygλ λ− × . 
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Proof: The QTM equation in terms of long-term growth rates is 
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )M V yg g g nπ+ × + = + × + × +
(1 ) (1 ) (1M yg g+ = + ×
Vg
. Assuming a ‘naïve’ Friedman k-percent 
rule is equivalent to . Both equations together imply that )+ n
π= . As the short-term and long-term nominal interest rates are constant in the 
steady-state, the optimal velocity equation (2) implies that 3 4(1 / )V yg gλ λ= − ×
3 4/ ) yg
. 
Combining with the previous relationship this implies that (1π λ λ= − × . QED. 
The long run real GDP/capita growth rate is estimated at 2.19% over the period 1959-
2007. Using the point estimate from Section 5 above I find that the optimal long-term rate 
of inflation has a value of 0.8725x 2.19% = 1.91%, which matches the rate of growth of 
money velocity. Next, I explore the feasibility of a link between a long-term money 
growth objective and interest rate targeting. 
 
7. A Long-Term Taylor-Type Rule Compatible with a Money Growth Rule 
It is my view in this section that a Taylor rule is effectively the central bank’s reaction 
function to optimal money holdings. In other words, assuming that the Fed knows the 
optimal quantity of money function, it can indirectly impact it by acting on the interest 
rate. If the central bank’s long-term objective is price stability, it is crucial that it 
understands well the actual behavior of the long-term optimum quantity of money 
function. Here, I derive a Taylor-type rule using the optimal quantity of money equation 
(1) rewritten as follows: . Where the 
constant 
1 4 3 4ln( ) / ( ) / ln( )
L S
t t tm C R R yλ λ λ λ= + × − + × t
4(1 )
41/ log
AC λλ= × δ
× −⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . I assume that there is a long term optimal amount 
of money tm  that corresponds to an equilibrium value for both the short-term and the 
long-term interest rates SR  and LR  and the potential real GDP/capita ty . Therefore, the 
optimum is defined by 1 4 3 4ln( ) / ( ) / ln( )
L S
t tm C R R yλ λ λ λ= + × − + × . Assume 
monetary authorities set out to pursue price stability by following a naïve k-percent 
Friedman type rule where nominal money growth equals long-run real GDP growth. That 
rule is equivalent to minimizing the difference between the log of the supply of real 
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money per-capita and the long-term optimal level, or setting ln( ) ln( ) 0t tm m− = , which 
leads to ( )S S L Lt tR R R R= + −  3 1/ ln( ) ln( )t ty yλ λ ⎡ ⎤+ × −⎣ ⎦ . 
To recover values close to Taylor’s (1993) rule, I assume along with Taylor (1998) 
that the long-term rate satisfies the Fisher effect, then LR = 2% (real interest) + π  
(inflation target), where π  = 1.91%. Furthermore, I assume that the current long-term 
rate is LtR = 2% (real interest) + πt, where πt stands for the expected inflation rate 
applicable to the current long-term nominal rate. In that case, I find that  
 3 1( ) / ln( ) ln( )
S S
t t t tR R y yπ π λ λ ⎡ ⎤= + − + × −⎣ ⎦  (5) 
Equation (5) is the key result of this section. The coefficients of this Taylor-type rule 
have economic meanings, which is not typically the case in the literature. In this context, 
the key coefficient of equation (5) is 3 1/λ λ , which is the ratio of the technological bias 
parameter divided by the leverage ratio of depository institutions. The naïve k-percent 
rule in equilibrium implies that the short-term interest rate must be set to the natural rate 
S LR R= , which in Taylor’s case is set at 2% real (assuming a 2% inflation). Taylor’s 
(1993) coefficients on the inflation and the output gaps are both 0.5. In my case, the 
coefficients are 1 for the inflation gap, and 0.8% for the log of the output gap. Of course, 
the comparison is not apples to apples as Taylor analyzes only a 5-year period, and I use 
a 50-year period. He uses the federal funds rate as the short-term rate, whereas I use the 3 
month T-Bill. Moreover, he uses real GDP not of real GDP/capita as I do here. The 
coefficient on the output gap is quite small in my case, which means a fairly insensitive 
response of policy to the business cycle. 
Because the two rules are essentially equivalent, why would the Fed not directly 
implement a money growth rule? In hindsight, the breakdown of money growth rules 
after 1982, pointed to the fact that the transmission channel did not account for shifts in 
velocity, and financial innovations. Possibly going the route of a Taylor rule may be 
easier if the parameters of the optimal velocity function are stable enough. 
It is important to emphasize however that the Taylor-type rule I derived assumes that 
the velocity of money is in its long-run equilibrium. This rule may be appropriate for 
example when the intent is to smooth interest rates and policy adjustments are gradual 
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(Dueker, 1999). It is not necessarily appropriate for sharp short-term policy responses to 
exogenous shocks, such as driving short-term rates to zero to avoid a recession. 
Notwithstanding, contrary to previously held beliefs, I am able to reconcile a ‘naïve’ k-
percent Friedman type of rule with a Taylor-type rule.34 Orphanides (2007) states: “A 
policy rule quite as simple as Friedman's k-percent rule cannot be formulated with an 
interest rate instrument. As early as Wicksell's (1898) monumental treatise on Interest 
and Prices, it was recognized that attempting to peg the short-term nominal interest rate 
at a fixed value does not constitute a stable policy rule. (Indeed, this was one reason why 
Friedman, 1968, and others expressed a preference for rules with money as the policy 
instrument.) Wicksell argued that the central bank should aim to maintain price stability, 
which in theory could be achieved if the interest rate were always equal to the economy's 
natural rate of interest, r*.”  
By contrast, I find that a k-percent money growth rule and a Taylor-type rule are 
interchangeable.35 Nevertheless, caution must be exercised when applying the naïve k-
percent rule in its interest targeting form. Setting the real short-term interest to its long-
term counterpart would constrain the real term structure to be flat. This might be a 
problem as this works against the segment of investors who are trying to hedge short-
term risk, and are willing to bid up short-term Treasuries and accept a lower real yield 
than that of long-term instruments. Faugere and Van Erlach (2009) for example show that 
since the mid-1950s real after-tax short-term one-year Treasury yields have embedded a 
negative time-varying risk premium by comparison to 30-year Treasuries. 
 
8. A Near 2% Target to Avoid “Bad” Deflations 
Whether or not the policy shift to a Taylor-type rule was done with that purpose in mind, 
a Taylor rule has the advantage of being more flexible by contrast with money supply 
growth objective, as it leads to a money supply that adjusts to short-term variations in the 
velocity of money and even to the case where velocity growth may stall in the long-term. 
Bordo and Filardo (2005) for example state that “When inflation is low, the usefulness of 
                                                 
34 An exception is Taylor (1998) who uses the QTM to informally derive a general Taylor type rule based 
on a constant money growth rule. But he does not specify nor does he derive a money demand function. 
35 There is a literature contrasting the effects of either rule in terms of their impact on economic stability 
(Evans and Honkapohja, 2003). 
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monetary aggregates may be exceeded by that of short-term interest rates, especially if 
velocity is sufficiently unpredictable.” 
Whereas Bordo and Filardo may be more concerned with short-term policy, avoiding 
long-term recessionary deflations is important as well. Assuming that the pace of 
innovation in the transaction technology slows down and velocity becomes constant (but 
not zero) then the Taylor type rule defined in Section 7 generates price stability, i.e. an 
actual inflation rate of 0%. Hence, with the help of this policy, actual inflation is mostly 
contained between 0% and 2%. On the other hand, velocity may temporarily accelerate 
faster than the 1.91% pace, as it did in the mid 1990s (M1 velocity). In that case, interest 
targeting leads to slightly greater inflation than desired. But this is a temporary situation 
because the pace of financial innovation must revert back to long-term productivity 
growth. 
A different but related literature has examined what inflation level is needed to avoid 
a recessionary deflation in the context of monetary policy hitting the zero nominal bound. 
Coenen et al. (2003) build a model for a small open economy with staggered wages 
subject to stochastic shocks similar in magnitude to those experienced in the U.S. over 
the 1980s and 1990s. Once shocks to aggregate demand or supply push the economy into 
a sufficiently deep deflation, a zero-interest-rate policy may not be able to return the 
economy to the original equilibrium. With a series of shocks large enough to sustain 
deflationary expectations and to keep the real interest rate above its equilibrium level, 
aggregate demand is suppressed further sending the economy into a deflationary spiral. 
They find that the consequences of the zero bound are negligible for target inflation rates 
as low as 2 percent but not lower. By contrast, my analysis clearly shows that interest 
targeting provides a long-term hedge against deflation, whether the zero bound is present 
or not.  
On the other hand, Friedman (1969) argues that a rate of deflation equal to the 
negative of the real interest rate might be desirable. Over the past 20 years, Friedman’s 
(1969) proposal has certainly been extensively analyzed by a plethora of macro models.36 
                                                 
36 A classic article that predicts Friedman’s result is Abel (1987). Mulligan and Salai-i-Martin (1997) 
provide a great survey in which they find that Friedman’s conclusion is model dependent. Of course, 
theoretically Friedman’s (1969) proposal is subject to the same limitations as mentioned before; given the 
assumptions of 1) satiation and 2) pre-existing monetized economy. Also it should be logically clear that 
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While, this prescription has been clearly rejected by major central banks as a guide for 
conducting long-term monetary policy, some low level deflation may be acceptable and 
even desirable, as long as it is accompanied by productivity increases and no severe 
downward spiral in nominal wages and aggregate demand. 
As the thesis of this paper argues, financial and technical innovations matter in 
determining the behavior of money velocity. While this is not a new idea, it seems that 
practically speaking, this point has been ignored by policymakers. The implication of my 
analysis is that a slow down of the velocity of money may accentuate the rate of 
deflation, turning it into a “bad” deflation as economic agents join the vicious cycle of 
money hoarding followed by economic slowdown. I am not here pinpointing the 
particular threshold where this would happen. However, it appears that the potential risks 
associated with Friedman’s (1969) recommendation are great and that central bankers 
have used their judgment correctly in staying away from it. 
 
9. Conclusion and Extensions 
In this paper, I provide a macroeconomic foundation for why the velocity of M1 behaved 
as it did over the past 50 years, as well as for why an inflation target near 2% is optimal. 
Even though policymakers may not be able to implement a precise target in practice, 
defining a credible and appropriate inflation target can help insure that economic 
expectations are firmly anchored, which for example has strong implications for the 
stability of assets prices.37 
I model the transaction costs savings of money relative to barter as a function of 
technical progress and of the net return on assets for the depository institutions, which 
itself depends on leverage. I logically arrive at the conclusion that transaction cost 
savings depend on the depository institutions leverage ratio due to the expansion of credit 
cards as a substitute for other sources of consumer/business credit. While the most 
recognizable feature of credit cards is their ability to substitute for money, I find that the 
key feature of this transmission mechanism is the grace period, which ultimately drives 
                                                                                                                                                 
Friedman’s concept is distinct from the issue of a liquidity trap. That is, monetary policy becoming 
ineffective to kick start the economy as the short-term interest is close to the zero bound (Goodfriend, 
2000; Clouse et al., 2000; Bernanke et al., 2004). 
37 Faugere and Van Erlach (2009) find that the Fisher effect on an after-tax basis is indeed present in equity 
indexes valuation and Treasuries yields. 
 32
the demand by convenience users, and possibly entices credit card users to carry a 
positive balance due to a lack of vigilance over meeting the card companies’ conditions 
(Ausubel, 1991). 
Using the standard optimality of money holdings condition, I am able to derive the 
optimal velocity of narrow money, which increases with real GDP/capita and decreases 
with the net return on depository institutions assets, and leverage. Empirically, I use a 
VECM approach (Johansen, 1988, 1991 and 1995) and find that for various adjusted 
measures of narrow money the long run velocity relation features parameter values 
consistent with the historical record. The leverage parameter in the cointegrating equation 
(using M1) is a near perfect match with estimates of the mean leverage ratio for 
depository institutions around a value of 15 over the past 50 years. 
As Reynard (2006) remarks, “It is often suggested that an explanation for the upward 
trend in M1 velocity during the post-war period is that technical progress in credit cards 
and other advances would have allowed individuals to economize on money balances, 
justifying an income elasticity below unity.” Here, I do find support for that insight. The 
income (real GDP/capita) elasticity of velocity is indeed less than unity because progress 
in the transaction technology is on average biased towards new forms of money. 
I assume that monetary authorities use a naïve Friedman k-percent rule in the sense 
that velocity is treated as a random walk with zero drift (Bordo and Jonung, 1987) and 
the money supply grows at the same pace as real GDP capita in the long-run. In 
conjunction with the optimal velocity result, this implies that the optimal rate of inflation 
is slightly below 2%, and is a function of the bias in progress parameter. My point 
estimate for the optimal long-run inflation rate is 1.91% for the U.S. Furthermore, I show 
that a Taylor type rule is fully consistent with a long-run money growth objective. 
As it turns out, seeking price stability, under the paradigm that the velocity of money 
is constant, is not so “naïve” after all. It guarantees that long-run inflation will remain 
between 0% and 1.91% and thus provides a complete hedge against deflation, would the 
pace of financial innovations and the velocity of money slow down. 
Future research will examine the evolution of money and its impact on velocity as 
new means of transaction continue to emerge. In particular, given the rising speed of 
networked computers, there is a resurgence of barter as a method of commerce. Other 
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possible extensions are to examine the future of non-central bank monies. The impact of 
securitization is also an aspect that merits further investigation, as the dynamic link 
between bank profits and the gap between lending rate vs. deposit rate is no longer as 
obvious, given that financial institutions can partially escape capital adequacy ratios by 
shipping risky (credit card) loans off their balance sheets. 
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Appendix A: The Credit Card Market and the “Banks” General Credit Market 
I show here that the quantity supplied of credit card loans is related to depository 
institutions’ net return on assets. Notwithstanding, the link is not necessarily as obvious 
as one might imagine. For example, one might assume that the net return on credit card 
loans is about equal to that of other loans because of market efficiency, and thus the 
quantity supplied of credit card loans should rise with the net return on banks assets. 
However, this is not correct because borrowers substitute between credit instruments to 
select the “cheapest” one, which turns out to be credit cards, as borrowers have the option 
of using the grace period to avoid finance charges. This is the core of the analysis done 
below. Let me first start by covering some of the unique features of the credit card 
market.  
First, it is well documented that during the 1980s and 1990s credit cards profits 
dramatically outpaced those of other types of bank loans. Ausubel (1997) reports that 
from 1983 to 1993 the return on assets (ROA) from credit card loans was roughly four 
times the banks’ overall ROA. On the other hand, data from the Federal Reserve shows 
that the proportion of revolving loans as a percentage of the total (revolving plus non-
revolving) has been rather stable around 37% on average since the early 1990s, with a 
slight upward trend peaking at about 41% in 1998-1999 and declining since then up until 
2010.38 One possible reason why institutions have not expanded the share of credit card 
loans in their portfolios during that period is that the risk exposure is much greater for 
these unsecured loans, so that capital adequacy ratios put in place by the Basel accords 
after 1988 have limited how much of these loans could be placed on the banks’ balance 
sheets.39 
Although it is unresolved at this point whether this is a permanent characteristic of the 
credit card market or not, Ausubel (1991 and 1997) documents that credit card rates are 
relatively insensitive to changes in short-term rates (costs of funds). However, they 
appear to be slightly more sensitive to changes in long-term rates at least since the 
interest rate ceilings on credit cards were removed in the early 1980s (Brown and Plache, 
                                                 
38 These figures are available from the author upon request. 
39 This is assuming the traditional commercial banking model prevails, whereas securitization has changed 
this situation since the mid 1990s. Currently about 60% of all credit card loans are securitized (Getter, 
2008). 
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2006). Stavins (1996) shows that the demand for credit cards is elastic, so the explanation 
of interest rate stickiness does not necessarily originate from the demand side, even 
though in some segments of the market, demand may be more inelastic. For example, the 
latter is true for customers with high balances, as they face high switching costs (Calem 
and Mester, 1994). One explanation for the uniformity of “high” rates across the industry 
is adverse selection. Banks do not want to unilaterally lower their rate, because in doing 
so they would attract a pool of higher risk customers. On the other hand, the supposedly 
high interest rates that the industry charges are nowhere near the rate they expect to 
receive. In 1996, it was estimated that over half and probably as much as 68% of credit 
card users were considered “convenience users”. These customers use credit cards 
primarily as a transactional medium and pay off their balances in full each month. 
Around that same time, Visa estimated that almost 60 percent of total bankcard volume 
generated no interest. By contrast, revolvers carry a positive balance at the end of the month. 
Below I analyze the connection between a drop in the banks’ net asset returns and the 
equilibrium quantity of credit cards on the market. Assume that the Fed implements a restrictive 
policy and sets the short-term interest rate at 1
S
0
SR R> . Figure 5 describes what happens in the 
depository institution’s loan market (excluding credit cards). The shift from the supply curve 
Supply0 to Supply1 takes place as depository institutions provide the same quantities of credit as 
before at the same maximized profit/net asset return, determined by long-run competition. Here, I 
assume that the net asset return for non-credit cards loans uses the same leverage ratio than for 
the total loan portfolio.  
Focus on the initial equilibrium Q0. The new interest on loans on the new supply 
curve ('0 1L S )R R  must be related to the old interest rate on loans ( )0 0L SR R  in the following 
way ( )'0 1L S (0 0L S )R R R R> , by the fact that '1 1 1 0 1 0(1 ) (1S L S1 0) LR R R Rλ λ λ= − λ− + + , where 1λ  
represents the leverage parameter. As long as, the demand is elastic, Figure 5 shows that 
the new equilibrium rate on loans ( )1 1L SR R  must satisfy ( ) '0 ( 1L S )1 1L SR R R< R  and 
1 1 1)
S L
1 (1 1 0 1 0(1 )
S LR R R Rλ λ λ< λ− + − + , so that 1 1 0L S L 0SR R R R− < − .40 Thus, a contractionary 
                                                 
40 The higher lending rates (long-term) will put pressure on the long-term bond market so the yields will go 
up there too. 
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monetary policy has the effect of decreasing the net asset return on (non-credit card) 
bank loans and reducing the quantity of these loans. 
The second stage of the argument is to examine what happens in the credit card 
market. I hypothesize that the market supply and demand of credit cards are “effective” 
in the sense that they are driven by the weighted average return on these loans, holding 
the total number of users and the proportion of revolvers vs. convenient users constant. 
What is happening here is a substitution effect on the demand side. Because other 
sources of credit are becoming more expensive, the demand for credit card loans will 
increase as a substitute, because borrowers believe they can control ex-ante the effective 
rate they pay. Even if customers have existing balances, they can transfer their balances 
to new credit cards and benefit from low introductory rates and a new grace period. 
Ausubel (1991) makes the point that credit card users often underestimate the amount 
they will borrow, as they are not careful enough to make payments on time, or face 
unforeseen adverse economic situations. The demand by ex-post convenience users 
should go up as some of these people will be able to implement the following arbitrage 
strategy. They can borrow money from the credit cards at a low effective rate (potentially 
0%) and lend this capital at a now higher short-term rate. In that case, some individual 
demands may even have a positive slope. The demand by ex-post revolvers also increases 
as they end-up with a positive balance, even if they had set-out to have zero balances. 
Moreover, they can always take out a regular bank loan and pay back their credit card 
balance, as long as they remain credit worthy. All in all, this results in a displacement of 
the demand for credit cards. 
Figure 6, shows how the demand labeled according to the short term rates ( 1 0
S SR R> ) 
shifted corresponding to an increased demand mostly driven by an increased proportion 
of convenience users. The proportion of customers who are “revolvers” is denoted by α.  
The rotation of the demand inward occurs holding the number of credit card loans 
constant, after the proportion of revolvers drops from α0 to α1. On the other hand, a larger 
number of loans causes the demand Demand1 (R1S) to shift outward and end-up where 
shown in the graph. 
Empirically, the maximum rates are insensitive to short-term rates, as discussed 
above. Assuming stickiness of maximum rates would actually make my argument 
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stronger. I choose to show on the graph an example where the maximum rate charged on 
credit cards does increase from R(R0S) to R(R1S). This case corresponds to a shift of an 
infinitely elastic (probably over a finite range) supply due to the higher cost of funds. 
This supply corresponds to the “best case” scenario for the banks where all customers 
would be revolvers. However, that is not what happens in reality. The amount by which 
the maximum rate shifts is explained below. 
The expected/average return on these loans is E(R0)=α0R(R0S) before the demand shift 
and E(R1)=α1R(R1S) after. The maximum rates R(R0S) and R(R1S) charged must satisfy 
λ1α0R(R0S)+(1-λ1)R0S = λ1α1R(R1S)+(1-λ1)R1S. In other words, given the leverage λ1, when 
the proportion of revolvers drops from α0 to α1, the maximum rate charged must rise so 
that the net asset return on credit card loans remains the same as the one determined by 
the long-run competitive equilibrium. The effective supply is actually shifting up as 
shown in Figure 6. In that case, banks are not receiving a greater net asset return on credit 
card loans. In conclusion, a rise in short-term interest rates leads to a substitution of less 
traditional bank loans in favor of more credit cards loans, at the same time as the net 
return on banks total assets is declining. A decrease in short-term interest rates leads to 
the reverse outcome.41 
On the other hand, an increase in Treasuries long-term rates first leads to an increase 
of bank lending rates, because of the two markets competing for funds. Thus, the supplies 
of bank loans shift (credit cards and non-credit cards). However, because of abnormally 
large profits, banks bid-up short-term instruments used for leverage. Hence, the supply 
shift of non-credit card loans is such that the net asset return is again the maximum 
achievable under long-run competition (holding the quantity of non-credit-card loans 
constant). Similarly as before, this leads to a decrease in the net asset return (movement 
along the demand curve) for non-credit card loans. Furthermore, the move upward in 
short-term rates and long-term rates impacts the maximum card rates. Thus, the credit 
card market is impacted the same way as before. Finally, I have shown that in all cases, 
                                                 
41 The analysis is done so that the aggregate amount of credit is held constant once the total effects of 
Figure 5 and 6 are combined. This is a key point because the comparative statics analysis of the 
transactional cost savings function requires the neat asset return to change, holding M1 constant.  
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the equilibrium quantity of credit card loans varies on a one-to-one basis with the net 
returns on assets for depository institutions.42 
 
42 It should be also clear to the reader that the above analysis is consistent with the bank “lending channel” 
approach to monetary policy as developed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988). 
 
 
Country Date Adopted Target Target variable
Australia 1993 Average of 2-3% over the 
medium term
Underlying PI up until October 
1998; CPI thereafter
Canada February 1991 Midpoint 2% + 1% band CPI
Finland February 1993 2% no explicit band CPI excluding indirect taxes, 
subsidies and housing-related 
New Zealand April 1988 0-3% CPI excluding interest
Spain* November 1994 2% CPI
Sweden January 1993 Midpoint 2% +1% band CPI
United Kingdom October 1992 2.5% +1% reporting range Retail price index excluding 
mortgage interest payments
Table 1
Inflation Targeting by G-7 Central Banks. Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
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 Visa and American Express Cards (1958) New Biased
First fully transistorized IBM 7090 mainframe computer (1959) Neutral
GE’s ERMA Computer to Process Checks (1959) New Biased
General purpose credit cards (BofA) (1966) New Biased
ATMs (1967) New Biased
Information Management System (IBM, 1968) Neutral
Magnetic Swipe Cards (1969) New Biased
Microprocessor (1970) Neutral
Heap Leach Technology for Gold Mining (1970) Old Biased
Clearing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS, 1970) New Biased
Automated Clearing House (ACH, 1972) New Biased
First PC Altair (1975) Neutral
Burns 70-78 Telephone Banking (1979) New Biased
Miller 78-79 Software Standardization of Fedwire System (1980) Neutral
Volcker 79-87 Activated Carbon Processes in Gold Mining (1980) Old biased
NOW Accounts (1981), Super NOWs and MMDAs (1982) ---
Commodore 64 (1982) Neutral
Lotus 123 (1982) Old Biased
Graphic User Interface (1983) Neutral
Windows 1.0 (1985) Neutral
386 chip (1985) Neutral
PC-Based Banking Clearinghouse Item Processing System (1986) Neutral
World Wide Web (1989) Neutral
Consolidation of Mainframe Computers at Fedwire (1990) New Biased
Pentium Chip (1993) Neutral
Web Browser Mosaic and Netscape (1994) Neutral
“All Electronic” Banking Clearinghouse ACH (1994) Neutral
Windows 95 (1995) Neutral
Bernanke 06- Online Banking (1995) New Biased
Completion of High-Speed Network FEDNET (1996) Neutral
Digital Money New Biased
E-barter Old Biased
?? Beyond 2007 Bernanke 06-
Transaction 
Technology
FM
Greenspan 87-06
Volcker 79-87    
Greenspan 87-06
1994-07
CM 1959-71
Table 2: Innovations Applicable to Transaction Technologies
1972-82
1983-93
Sample 
Period
Type of 
Progress
Fed 
Chairmanship
Mc Chesney-
Martin 51-70
Innovations Affecting Money Supply and Transaction 
Technology
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 Figure 1: Indexed Log of Narrow Money Velocity (M1, M1RS, and M1S). 1959-2007.
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Figure 2: Indexed Log of M1 Velocity vs. Log Real GDP/capita. 1959-2007.
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 Figure 3: Asset/Equity (leverage) for Depository Institutions. 1959-2007. Source: Compustat. 
Outlier values above 100 removed.
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Figure 4: Retail and Total Sweeps respectively as % of M1RS and M1S 1994-2007
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Figure 5: "Bank" Credit Market (excluding Credit Cards)-- Restrictive Monetary Policy
Figure 6: Credit Card Market-- Restrictive Monetary Policy
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